This article examines the impact of structural changes in the postwar film industry on the activities and effectiveness of the foreign distribution subsidiaries of American firms. As these subsidiaries saw their regular supply of films from their in-house Hollywood studios decline, they sought out alternative sources of product content, often from local markets. Unable to rely on the traditional "ownership" advantages bestowed on them by their parent firms, these subsidiaries increasingly needed to integrate into local networks and forge closer relationships with local producers and exhibitors. Our focus is on Italy, one of the most important film markets for US companies in the 1960s. We collect data on the box office revenues and screen time allocated to every film released into the first-run cinema market and compare the effectiveness of American versus Italian distributors in maximizing the exposure of their most popular films. We explore the attempts by US firms to form partnerships with Italian distributors and producers. Finally, we examine available archival records to reveal the detailed activities of US distribution offices in Italy and their attempts to integrate into local business networks. We conclude that while US subsidiaries did not fully succeed in becoming "insiders" within the Italian film industry in this period, they did actively work toward such an objective.
The question of how the foreign subsidiaries of multinational fi rms overcome the challenges of doing business abroad remains an important question for theorists and historians of international business. 1 Do these subsidiaries rely on the "ownership advantages" of their corporate parents to surmount their inherent foreignness; or do they seek to lessen (or disguise) their foreignness by becoming more deeply embedded in the local business environment? Do we fi nd subsidiaries shifting from one strategy to the other as the competitive environment changes over time? This article focuses on the foreign distribution subsidiaries of major American fi lm companies following the collapse of the so-called Hollywood studio system. The period was one that saw international distribution become increasingly important for US fi rms, yet the traditional advantage on which these foreign subsidiaries had relied (exclusive access to the output of in-house Hollywood fi lm studios) was unraveling. How did foreign distribution subsidiaries respond to this situation?
The demise of the Hollywood studio system and the structural disintegration of the fi lm industry in the 1950s and 1960s have attracted the interest of scholars from various academic disciplines. The industry has provided a case study of the shift from a classical "Fordist" system of mass production, in which manufacture, distribution, and exhibition of fi lms was controlled by an oligopoly of vertically integrated fi rms to one based on fl exible networks of small specialist fi rms that combined to produce and market individual fi lms on a project-by-project basis. 2 Whether this evolution involved the crossing of an 'industrial divide' has been a matter of contention, but its implications have been widely analysed and discussed. 3 Economic geographers have examined the location of production activities, emphasising the continued dominance of the industrial cluster centered on Hollywood, while identifying concentrations of specialist fi rms elsewhere in pre-or postproduction services and activities. 4 Economic historians have explored how fi lm producers responded to the increasing levels of uncertainty in the postwar era, developing new strategies for the management of risk. 5 Organization theorists have identifi ed the "New Hollywood" as one of the most visible illustrations of the changing nature of the workplace, seeing the fi lm industry as an exemplar of the emerging creative economy. 6 Historians of international business, however, have had relatively little to say about the fi lm industry in the postwar decades, even though the period was one in which foreign markets grew in signifi cance for the leading American fi rms. 7 At one level, this is understandable. Far from identifying the emergence of a new postindustrial era, historians of multinational enterprise point to the 1950s and 1960s as the period in which FDI fl ows were dominated by large American manufacturing fi rms. 8 As far as the growth of international business was concerned, the postwar decades look like the highpoint of the integrated Chandlerian fi rm. Even within the fi lm industry it appeared, on the surface at least, as though the functioning of international fi rms remained largely unchanged in the postwar decades. The distribution arms of the major US fi lm companies built global networks of subsidiaries in the 1920s and 1930s, and these remained largely intact throughout the twentieth century. 9 A closer examination of international fi lm distribution in this period, however, reveals a more complex (and perhaps a more interesting) picture. While the presence of US-owned fi lm distributors in international markets may not have changed very much in the 1950s and 60s, the functions performed by these subsidiaries, and the resources on which they depended, did evolve very signifi cantly. The breakup of vertical structures in the industry did, in fact, have very serious implications for the distribution subsidiaries of US fi rms, creating incentives for those subsidiaries to become more deeply embedded in their local markets.
The idea that foreign subsidiaries of multinational fi rms might need to be closely integrated into local business communities as well as the organizational network of their parent fi rm is now well established within international business (IB) theory, though this was not always the case. 10 The foundations of modern IB theory stem, at least 5. Sedgwick in part, from attempts to understand the unprecedented growth of FDI fl ows from the United States to Western Europe in the postwar decades (which could not be explained by existing theories of capital investment). 11 The emerging theory emphasized a clear distinction between "direct" and "portfolio" investments, with the former serving as the basis for multinational enterprises (MNEs) that owned and controlled value-adding activities in more than one country. 12 Central to the new theory was the knowledge base and strategic intent of parent fi rms. Thus FDI occurred when fi rms were in possession of some particularly valuable knowledge, skills, or resources; when they were able to identify a strategic opportunity to exploit this knowledge or resource in a particular foreign location; and, fi nally, when it was more benefi cial to exploit these advantages through internal expansion than through licencing to local agents. 13 The theory, which was developed and refi ned through the 1970s and 1980s, provided a logical explanation for global patterns of FDI in the second half of the twentieth century but left little room for the agency of subsidiary fi rms. Theorists did recognize that foreign subsidiaries faced real challenges in competing against local rivals. Indeed, it was precisely because these subsidiaries faced a "liability of foreignness" that they needed to posses a clear advantage over local rivals to remain competitive. 14 Thus the key to success for foreign subsidiary companies (in early IB theory at least) was their ability to draw on the superior knowledge and resources of their parent fi rms. A subsidiary fi rm's embeddedness within the systems and structures of its parent fi rm may have made it "foreign," but it also provided the necessary advantages to overcome this liability. Conceived this way, the "foreignness" of overseas subsidiaries is unchanging, and their ability to integrate into local networks or acquire local knowledge is largely irrelevant. They live or die by the value of the fi rm-specifi c advantages bestowed by their parents. Such a view is not diffi cult to reconcile with the notion of MNEs as institutions that wield immense market power and that the rapid expansion of US multinationals after 1945 marked the emergence of American hegemony. 15 In recent decades historians interested in the idea of Americanization have sought to distance themselves from concepts such as American hegemony, preferring instead to highlight the role of local actors in (selectively) adopting American ideas and adapting them to particular local or national contexts. 16 Similarly the IB literature, since the mid1980s, has focused increasing attention on the activities of subsidiary fi rms in adapting the knowledge and resources of their parents to local market needs. 17 Scholars began to see the balance of global integration and local responsiveness as a key strategic challenge facing multinational fi rms. 18 By the turn of the century, IB theorists were beginning to speak of "competence creating subsidiaries," and it was becoming increasingly apparent that the success of foreign affi liates could be determined not just by their access to the fi rm-specifi c advantages of their parents, but also by their integration into local business communities and access to local, market-specifi c knowledge. 19 IB theorists now refer to the dual (or multiple) embeddedness of subsidiary fi rms. 20 Alongside this reassessment of the role of subsidiary companies, IB scholars have also sought to reevaluate the concept of liability of foreignness. 21 If subsidiaries can, over time, become embedded within local business networks, does this mean that they are able to become less "foreign"? Are fi rms from some countries more "foreign" than others? Recent historical scholarship shows that, in a given host market, foreign subsidiaries from different home countries could face very different challenges, with their country-of-origin viewed in either positive or negative terms, and that this was subject to change over time. 22 24 The extent to which subsidiaries are able to behave as insiders within a given foreign market, on the other hand, is potentially much more varied and complex. The conceptualization around outsidership/insidership is helpful to our understanding of subsidiaries as multiembedded enterprises. A subsidiary's embeddedness within its parent fi rm may enable it to overcome a liability of foreignness (as traditional IB theory explains), but if it becomes embedded in local business networks does its position begin to evolve from that of an outsider to one of increasing insidership? What are the circumstances under which subsidiary fi rms would be motivated to strive for insider status within a foreign market? How does such a process play out in practice?
The structural changes within the postwar fi lm industry provide an excellent context in which to explore such questions. Here we have a case in which the foreign subsidiaries of US multinationals were incentivized to move from a system of single-to multipleembeddedness. We do not regard this to have been a natural or inevitable evolution, but rather the result of a very specifi c set of historical circumstances. This article explains the reason for this shift and reveals some of the mechanisms by which subsidiaries sought to enhance their insider status. After outlining how the breakup of the studio system affected the basic structure of international fi lm distribution, attention is focused on Italy, which was an important cinema market for at least two reasons. First, compared to markets such as the US, UK, or Germany, competition from television and other leisure activities had a much smaller impact on cinema attendance in Italy in the 1950s and 60s. 25 While other national markets were in rapid decline, the Italian fi lm market continued to grow, becoming an increasingly important source of revenue for US distributors. 26 Second, the period witnessed a resurgence in creativity within the Italian fi lm industry and something of a boom in domestic fi lm production. 27 Here, then, we have one of Hollywood's largest foreign markets, but also a vibrant domestic fi lm industry where US distributors faced no shortage of local competition. We draw on both quantitative and qualitative data to make our case. Our most important source of statistical evidence is a newly constructed dataset, based on information held in Borsa Film , an offi cial trade publication-sponsored by the national association of exhibitors-which contains details of the box offi ce revenues generated by, and the screen time allocated to, every fi lm released into the Italian fi rst-run market between cinema seasons 1957-1958 and 1970-1971 . Borsa also records the distributor of each fi lm, as well as its director and leading actors. To this data we have added information on the producers of each fi lm, drawn from the Internet Movie Database (IMDb). The creation of this dataset enables us to assess the performance of different fi lm distributors in Italy. Specifi cally, it allows us to compare the effectiveness of American and Italian distributors, as well as that of Italian-American joint ventures, in terms of their ability to maximize the screen time allocated to their most popular fi lms. Was it the case, for example, that local distributors were able to secure more exposure for their fi lms in prime cinema locations than foreign rivals? The quantitative data, in other words, allows us to measure the liability of outsidership faced by US subsidiaries and whether the formation of local joint ventures helped to overcome this. The statistical evidence, however, can only take us so far. It indicates that while US fi rms may have had incentives to engage in local distribution partnerships, the advantages of such partnerships for Italian companies were much less apparent. Very few distribution joint ventures were actually sustained for more than a few years. For US-owned subsidiaries in Italy, if insidership could not be achieved through the creation of local partnerships it would need to be built up through the knowledge and connections of local managers. To examine how this was attempted, we turn to the archives of one of the leading US distributors, Warner Bros. We scrutinize the records of Warner's Italian distribution subsidiary and its correspondence with the corporate head offi ce to uncover the activities, contacts, and relationships being pursued by the fi rm's Italian management. Having twice tried (and failed) in the early 1960s to form distribution partnerships with local fi rms, how did this particular American subsidiary company seek to enhance its insider status in the Italian market?
US Film Distributors and their International Markets
US fi lm companies could make a stronger claim than most multinationals to the status of truly global organizations in the mid-twentieth century. Writing in the Harvard Business Review in 1930, William Victor Strauss confi dently declared that "there are few American industries that are more dependent upon foreign markets than the motion picture industry; and there are still fewer industries in which American dominance of world markets has, in the past, been more dramatic and complete." 28 In the period covered here markets outside of the United States and Canada typically accounted for more than half of total sales, with the majority of this foreign revenue coming from Europe. 29 The infl uence of Hollywood in Europe is a topic that has attracted much attention from historians, although the infl uence of Europe on the strategy and practices of US fi lms distributors is less well understood. 30 Studies of cinema audiences and the reception of fi lms in Europe have pointed to the popularity of domestic fi lms and argued that the Hollywood fi lms with the greatest appeal were usually those with themes or stars to whom domestic audiences could most easily relate. 31 Such research suggests that US fi lm distributors would have had a clear incentive to adapt their fi lm portfolios to the particular preferences of their main international markets, yet little work has been done to examine whether the subsidiaries of US fi lm multinationals did in fact attempt to do this. 32 Much of the existing work that does look at Hollywood and its foreign markets, focuses extensively on fi lm policy-in particular on the role of the Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA) in pressuring foreign governments to ease restrictions on the imports of American fi lms. 33 While this work demonstrates that the MPEA and its predecessor, the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA), did undeniably play an important role in facilitating the export of Hollywood entertainment, there is a danger that by overemphasising their role in shaping fi lm policy we too easily begin to treat "Hollywood" as a homogenous entity whose primary function was to support US foreign policy objectives. From the perspective of IB theory, this literature focuses almost exclusively on the country-specifi c advantages enjoyed by US companies but fails to explore their fi rm-specifi c characteristics. The major US fi lm companies did indeed collaborate under the banner of the MPEA in order to press for common political objectives, but when it came to managing their business operations in specifi c markets, the fi rms were competitors and often pursued quite distinct business strategies. 34 This article focuses attention not just at the fi rm level, but at that of the foreign subsidiary. Before examining the activities and performance of subsidiary fi rms, however, we should introduce their parents.
The transformation of the US fi lm industry in the 1950s and 1960s was triggered by declining cinema audiences in the face of competition from television and the requirement that fi rms sell their domestic cinema chains in compliance with antitrust legislation in the form of the Paramount decree of 1948. 35 The period witnessed the disintegration of industry structures with the so-called major "studios" relinquishing direct ownership and control over both cinema exhibition and the vast majority of Hollywood fi lm production. 36 Yet as far as fi lm distribution was concerned, continuity was at least as evident as change. 37 With the exception of RKO, which withdrew from fi lm production and distribution in 1957, the oligopoly of US fi rms that had emerged to dominate global fi lm distribution in the 1920s remained intact. 38 During the 1930s and 1940s a distinction could be drawn between the "big fi ve" fi lm companies (MGM, Paramount, 20th Century Fox, Warner Bros., and RKO), and the "little three" (Universal, Columbia, and United Artists). 39 The former group were characterized by their ownership of large domestic cinema chains in the United States and their extensive fi lm production activities (typically 40-60 feature fi lms per year). The "little three" did not operate cinema chains, and if they engaged in fi lm production at all, they did so on a less ambitious scale than the larger vertically integrated fi rms. 40 By the 1960s the distinction between "big fi ve" and "little three" had largely dissolved. Film distribution (rather than production or exhibition) was now the primary activity of all the major fi rms. The postwar decades saw Universal, Columbia, and United Artists grow in prominence, while the once-mighty MGM (the leading fi lm producer of the 1930s and 1940s) saw its market position gradually decline. Each of these companies had built up an extensive global network of distribution offi ces in the 1920s and 1930s. 41 While subsidiaries based in territories controlled by the Axis powers were forced to close during the Second World War, the majority of these offi ces were reopened soon after the end of hostilities, and by the mid-1950s the international reach of these distribution companies was wider than ever. 42 The period under examination here was not one in which US fi lm companies were expanding abroad for the fi rst time. These were multinational enterprises with several decades of experience operating in overseas markets. In Europe, the key challenge they faced was not one of market entry, but of how to maintain competitiveness in diverse and rapidly evolving market environments. During the so-called studio era, the task of distribution subsidiaries of the major US fi rms had essentially been to handle the local release of its parents' fi lms. Ownership of the intellectual property rights to these pictures constituted the primary "advantage" on which these subsidiaries traded. Moreover, the volume of fi lms that US distribution subsidiaries were able to offer was highly valued by local exhibitors, particularly in second-and third-run markets, who required a high quantity of product (due to their practice of screening double-feature programs, which were typically replaced on a twice weekly basis). 43 As vertical structures within the industry began to disintegrate, however, the supply of "in-house" product began to run dry.
The 1950s saw major fi lm companies like MGM and Warner Bros. signifi cantly reduce their volume of studio production. As Table 1 demonstrates, by the 1960s it was clear that not only was the total number of fi lms being released by leading US distributors in decline, but these distributors were increasingly reliant on external sources of supply. For the foreign distribution subsidiaries of US fi rms, this meant their long-standing source of competitive advantage (exclusive rights to the fi lms of their in-house Hollywood studio) was beginning to look precarious. Even if the rights to distribute a certain proportion of independently produced Hollywood fi lms could be secured, their supply of American fi lms remained on a downward trajectory.
As depicted in Figure 1 , foreign distribution offi ces of US fi rms were increasingly required to source local content to meet the needs of local audiences. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Italy.
41. Thompson, Exporting Entertainment . 42 . The numbers of international distribution offi ces operated by each of these fi rms was recorded annually in the Film Daily Yearbook .
43. Sedgwick, Pokorny, and Miskell, "Hollywood in the World Market."
The Market for Film in 1960s Italy
Between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s Italy's economy grew by an average of 5.6 percent each year-a faster rate of growth than (almost) any other European country. 44 This so-called economic miracle enabled Italy to effectively catch up with the most advanced industrial economies. 45 Investment in US-style mass production technologies under the Marshall Plan and the opening up of intraEuropean trade within the European Economic Community (of which Italy was a founding member) created opportunities for export-led growth. 46 The system of fi xed exchange rates and capital controls agreed upon at Bretton Woods meant that the lira remained highly competitive and the export-led boom could be sustained, which, in turn, encouraged further investment in technology and improved productivity. 47 Italy was thus able to take maximum economic advantage of comparatively low labor costs as well as cheap energy. Growth was most pronounced in industrial sectors such as engineering, chemicals, and metals, often led by state-owned organizations, with relatively few large-scale private enterprises (such as automaker Fiat) coming to the fore. 48 The fruits of Italy's rapidly expanding GDP were not lost on workers and consumers. Net national income almost doubled in real terms from around ₤17,000 billion in the mid-1950s to ₤30,000 billion 48. Felice and Vecchi, "Italy's Modern Economic Growth." in the mid-1960s. The same period saw net income per capita grow from ₤350,000 to ₤571,000. Agricultural employment dropped while employees in manufacturing industries rose from 32% to 40% and in the service sector from 28% to 35%. 49 An increasingly affl uent industrial workforce found itself with more money to spend and a greater range of consumption choices in their leisure time. Activities such as Sunday trips in the iconic Fiat 500 became not just possible, but widely popular. One contemporary novelist was able to write of the early 1960s as an "unexpected belle époque ," 50 while later historians have charted a process in which Italians adopted the "models and myths of capitalistic consumerism." 51 Cinematically, these developments were captured in fi lms such as Fellini's La Dolce Vita / The Sweet Life (1960) , as well as a range of comedies that drew on the rapidly evolving social and economic landscape as a source of humor. 52 Notwithstanding the advent of TV broadcasting, 53 in Italy, unlike many other European economies, the cinema industry was a beneficiary of this economic growth. 54 Whereas rates of cinema attendance (and numbers of cinemas) were in steep decline in the US, UK, and Germany by the 1960s, the Italian market remained remarkably buoyant. 55 Cinema going as a social activity had become deeply embedded in cities such as Rome in the 1950s, 56 and it continued to exert a strong appeal throughout the 1960s, especially among younger audiences. 57 Table 2 through the 1960s at around 11,000 to 12,000. 58 The total number of screening days at Italian cinemas grew throughout the 1950s (peaking in 1962), and screen days remained 20 percent higher in 1971 than they had been in 1950. The enduring appeal of cinema entertainment, combined with admission prices that rose faster than the rate of infl ation, meant that box offi ce revenues continued to grow throughout the period. At current prices, expenditure on cinema entertainment grew by 87 percent between 1958 and 1971. At constant prices the fi gure stands at 19 percent. As well as being a growing market, Italy was also a relatively unrestricted one for American fi lm distributors. 59 The Italian-American Film Agreement, originally signed in 1951, 60 did place a limit on the number of American pictures that US distributors could release annually in Italy, but the fi gure was set at a suffi ciently high level that major US companies were not prevented from handling the distribution of their own productions in Italy. There was no limit imposed on the number of American fi lms that could be released by Italian distributors. In 1962 the fi lm quota was dropped entirely, leading the American trade press to report that "according to the [Motion Picture Export] Association, the new agreement assures virtually a free market for United States fi lms in Italy." 61 These trends meant that Italy became an increasingly important market for the major US fi lm distributors in the postwar decades. In the 1930s and 1940s the UK dwarfed all other foreign markets as far as the Hollywood studios were concerned, with around half of all foreign revenues derived from there. 62 By the early 1960s Italy was not only Hollywood's largest non-English language foreign market, it was almost equal to the British one in terms of the revenues it generated for US distributors. 63 If the Italian market became an increasingly attractive location for US fi lm companies in the 1960s, it was also one that was becoming increasingly competitive. As Hollywood studios scaled back production in response to declining audiences at home and in other parts of the English speaking world, Italian fi lm production blossomed. 64 In 1958 the output of Italian fi lm production companies was 141 pictures, but by 1972 (the peak year) this fi gure had doubled to 280. This contrasted with a decline in the numbers of American fi lms being distributed in Italy from 233 in 1958 to 127 in 1967. 65 Film historians tend to agree that it was not just the volume of Italian fi lm production that was increasing in this period, but also its quality. 66 Thieves (1948) , by the mid-1950s the focus of Italian cinema had shifted from "fi lms of the people" to "fi lms for the people." The 1960s witnessed the emergence of popular genres such as the spaghetti western , which appealed to both international audiences and domestic ones, as well as the establishment of a lasting tradition of commedia all'italiana , which provided the basis for some of the best-loved fi lms of the day and has remained popular in Italy ever since. 68 As Peter Bondanella argues, "the decade between 1958 and 1968 may in retrospect be accurately described as the golden age of Italian cinema, for in no other single period was its artistic quality, its international prestige, or its economic strength so consistently high." 69 Gian Piero Brunetta identifi es the emergence of an "Italian style" in the postwar period that "would help to shape international cinema, infl uencing directors like Scorsese, Coppola, Ivory, and Campion." 70 The Italian fi lm market may have become increasingly important for the major US fi lm distributors by the 1960s, but it was a market in which Hollywood fi lms were far from dominant. American pictures accounted for more than half of all box offi ce revenues in Italy in 1958 (with Italian fi lms earning just over 30 percent of the total). Yet by 1972 the share of box offi ce revenues earned by US fi lms had dropped to little more than 15 percent, while Italian productions (or coproductions) held more than 60 percent of the market. 71 The fi gures commonly cited in the secondary literature for the numbers of American and Italian fi lms released into the market, and the share of box offi ce revenue they attracted, are consistent with the evidence from our dataset. The number of US fi lms released into the fi rst-run market, according to our data, fell from 326 in the 1957/1958 season to 151 in 1970/1971. Italian fi lm releases over the same period grew from 140 to 210 per year. Figure 2 illustrates that the turnaround in market share held by US and Italian fi lms was evident in fi rstrun cinema venues as well as the wider market. While our dataset captures only information on a proportion of the Italian fi lm market in this period, there are good reasons to believe that this was a particularly important sector of the market that broadly refl ected wider industry trends. Did the growth in the share of the market held by Italian fi lms simply refl ect the increased number of such fi lms being released, or were these domestic productions genuinely more popular than Hollywood movies? The question is not directly addressed in most surveys of the Italian fi lm industry, yet it is crucial if we are to understand the strategies of fi rms operating within this market. The information in our dataset on box offi ce earnings of each fi lm allows us to compare the appeal of US and domestic productions for Italian audiences. (It should be noted that any coproductions involving Italian producers are classifi ed here as Italian fi lms, and, similarly, coproductions involving US companies are listed as American. There was a small number of US-Italian productions released throughout the period that have been classifi ed separately. While these do not feature in the charts, they are discussed below.) Figure 3 shows that for much of the period under review the popularity of Italian and American fi lms was broadly comparable. The shift in the overall share of the market toward Italian pictures (and away from Hollywood) was largely determined by the numbers of these fi lms being released, rather than any decisive change in consumer preference for domestic product. Certainly, we can say that the sharp decline in market share held by US fi lms in the late 1950s was almost entirely explained by the reduction in the number of Hollywood pictures being produced at the tail end of the studio system. Only toward the end of the period do we appear to see an emerging preference for Italian fi lms (we are unable to say for how long this endured), and this explains the shift in market share toward domestic product at the end of the 1960s. Among the most popular American fi lms released in Italy during our period we fi nd a preponderance of "sword-and-sandal" epics, such as The Bible/La Bibbla (John Huston, 1966) , The Ten Commandments/I Dieci Comandamenti (Cecil B DeMille, 1956) , Cleopatra (Joseph Mankiewicz, 1963) , and Ben Hur (William Wyler, 1959 Life (1960) was also among the ten most popular fi lms released throughout the period.
If the popularity of American and Italian fi lms was broadly comparable for most of our period, the same cannot be said for the small number of joint US/Italian productions released at this time. With only four or fi ve such pictures typically released each year (and just one or two in some years), the average earnings of these fi lms varied enormously from season to season. For the 60 US/Italian fi lm releases throughout the period, however, average box offi ce revenues amounted to ₤106 million in the fi rst-run market, more than double the average revenues of either US or Italian pictures. Our dataset provides no information on the popularity of these fi lms outside Italy, and, of course, worldwide revenue (and profi t) performance would have been the yardstick by which producers judged the success or failure of such fi lms. It is noticeable, however, that a number of these fi lms, such as Doctor Zhivago (produced by MGM/Carlo Ponti) and El Cid (produced by Samuel Bronston/Dear Film), were based on widely recognized stories or characters with a broad international appeal.
As far as US fi lm distributors in the Italian market were concerned, we can clearly see that incentives existed for them to build and strengthen the local component of their product portfolios during this period. The declining numbers of US fi lms being produced by the Hollywood studios meant that if they were to maintain their share of this growing market, US fi rms needed to secure distribution rights to more Italian pictures. The fact that Italian fi lms were no less popular than Hollywood ones (and grew in popularity as the period progressed) would only have reinforced this need. Given the increasing reliance of US distribution subsidiaries on fi lms made by outside producers, it was becoming increasingly important for these fi rms to demonstrate that they could operate as effectively as local competitors in promoting and marketing pictures in foreign markets. The distribution subsidiaries of US fi rms could no longer rely on the property rights to their parent company's fi lms in order to overcome a traditional liability of foreignness. Establishing a position of insidership within major foreign markets such as Italy became increasingly important, both to secure distribution rights to popular local productions and to maximize the screen time allocated to their releases. The information held in our dataset allows us to examine the effectiveness of US distributors in both regards.
The System of Film Distribution and the Effectiveness of US and Italian Distributors
Commercial fi lm distribution in Italy in the postwar period was organized around 16 cities that acted as regional distribution centers. Cinema venues in each location fi tted into a clear hierarchy with larger city center "fi rst-run" theaters showing new releases before fi lms continued their distribution through second-and third-run cinemas. First-run cinemas constituted about 10 percent of all cinemas in each of the 16 centers, but as they were typically the largest venues charging the highest admission prices, they constituted much more than 10 percent of revenues. Moreover, without the marketing platform of a fi rst-run release, it was much harder for a fi lm to secure bookings in the second-and third-run markets. Film distributors, therefore, had a very strong incentive to ensure that as many of their fi lms as possible received a fi rst-run release.
First-run fi lm distribution was clearly very important, but access to the fi rst-run market was also highly competitive. Not only were fi rst-run cinema venues relatively few in number, they also tended to book fi lms for longer runs than was the case in second-or third-run halls. The purpose of fi rst run distribution was to showcase the most prominent (and popular) fi lms, which might attract audiences from a broad geographic area, rather than to provide a regular local audience with a reliable but ever-changing stream of entertainment. As such, fi rst-run cinema venues required a smaller volume of product than second-or third-run halls, which meant that competition between distributors to secure fi rst-run bookings could be quite intense. In an era when US distributors held exclusive access to Hollywood entertainment (and these fi lms faced relatively modest local competition), American fi rms held a powerful position vis-à-vis fi rst-run exhibitors. As local competition increased, and as their supply of in-house product declined, American subsidiaries found themselves needing to work much harder to secure prime fi rst-run bookings for their fi lms in the most important venues. No longer able to rely on exclusive access to the bulk of the most popular fi lms, US distributors' subsidiaries needed to fi nd ways of acquiring rights to popular local fi lms and of persuading local exhibitors to allocate valuable screen time to their releases. In this context the strength of a distributor's connections and the depth of their relationships with local fi lm producers and exhibitors became increasingly important. Previous studies have been unable to assess whether some distributors were more successful than others in securing access to fi rst-run cinema screens in Italy. The information in our dataset now makes this possible.
Up to now we have looked at aggregated data for very large numbers of fi lms, but it is important to recognize that the distribution of box-offi ce revenues was highly uneven, with a small number of "hit" fi lms capturing a large proportion of the total market. 72 For fi lm distributors, what really mattered was not the typical performance of their median cinema release, but their ability to maximize the earning potential of their most popular "hit" fi lms. While the average box offi ce revenue earned by the 6445 fi lm releases in the fi rst-run market was ₤44 million (at 1957 prices), around two-thirds of these releases earned less than ₤30 million and between them generated less than 16 percent of total box offi ce receipts. The top 6 percent of releases, on the other hand, each earning at least ₤150 million, accounted for around 42 percent of total revenues.
While it was not possible for fi rms to accurately predict, ex ante , the extent of popular appeal for each picture, it was possible for them to secure extended screen time for hit fi lms once the level of their popularity had been revealed within the fi rst few days of release. In seeking to maximize the earning potential of their most popular fi lms, the interests of distributors were eventually brought into confl ict with fi rst-run cinema exhibitors. Both distributors and exhibitors benefi ted from the success of the most popular fi lms, and both had an incentive to extend the runs of the very best performing fi lms. The critical issue was, for how long should these runs be extended? Demand to see even the most popular fi lms diminished eventually, and as the number of screening days was extended, the revenue generated per day inevitably began to fall. For cinema exhibitors, there was a strong incentive to maintain daily takings at as high a level as possible. This meant that once demand for a fi lm began to wane, it needed to be replaced quickly by a new picture that had the potential to earn more per day (even if only for a short time). Distributors, on the other hand, were primarily concerned with maximizing the revenue (and the exposure) of their leading fi lms in the fi rst-run market, and their incentive was to ensure that fi lms were screened for as many days as possible until their demand had been virtually exhausted. By examining not just the box offi ce revenues, but also the number of screen days allocated to each fi lm in the fi rst-run market, we can see which types of distributors (and which types of fi lms) were most successful in obtaining an extended cinema release.
We begin our investigation of this question by comparing the relationship between the box offi ce revenues generated by, and the screen time allocated to, each fi lm in our dataset. Unsurprisingly, we fi nd a positive correlation between the two. We also fi nd the relationship to be extremely strong. A simple correlation of box offi ce revenue and screening days for all 6445 fi lm releases in our dataset produces a positive coeffi cient of 0.95. This refl ects the fact that both distributors and exhibitors had a clear incentive to expand the supply of the most popular fi lms in the market at the expense of less popular pictures and that the system of distribution was effective in matching supply and demand. (One might argue, in fact, that box offi ce revenue was actually a predictor of screen days rather than vice versa.) Given the strong correlation between box offi ce revenue and screen days, there is clearly only limited scope for the nationality of a fi lm's distributor (or its producer) to infl uence the nature of this relationship. Wasn't it simply the case, therefore, that the most popular fi lms were allocated the longest runs, irrespective of where those fi lms came from? Well, yes, but only up to a point. Figure 4 plots the relationship between box offi ce revenues and screen days for both Italian fi lm releases and American pictures. As we would expect, there is a strong positive correlation in both cases (the R-squared fi gures are 0.95 and 0.96). Interestingly, however, we see that the line of best fi t follows a slightly different path in each case. Among the less popular fi lms it is almost impossible to identify any difference between US and Italian releases. Toward the top end of the revenue distribution, however, where we fi nd the most popular hit fi lms, it appears that exhibitors did show a preference for screening Italian pictures over American ones. Here the two lines on the chart begin to diverge. Why should fi rst-run cinema exhibitors have prioritized the screening of Italian fi lms over American ones? Wasn't it in their commercial interests to screen the most popular fi lms, irrespective of their nationality? The explanation almost certainly lies in an incentive to book Italian fi lms that exhibitors received in the form of a tax rebate. 73 The Motion The most striking feature of Figure 5 is the apparent discrepancy between Italian and American distributors in terms of their ability to maximize screen time for their most popular Hollywood fi lms. Once again, differences at the lower end of the revenue distribution are diffi cult to detect. For fi lms that did not prove to be a hit with the public, access to the fi rst-run market was quickly restricted, irrespective of their national origin, or that of their distributors. Among the most popular Hollywood releases, however, Italian distributors clearly appeared to be more successful than their US counterparts in extending the duration of fi rst-run bookings. The biggest American hit fi lms during our period were typically screened for more days in fi rst-run venues if their distribution was handled by an Italian fi rm rather than a subsidiary of one of the US majors.
One possible explanation for the apparent preference shown by fi rst-run exhibitors to Italian distributors could be that US fi lm renters demanded higher rental prices than their Italian counterparts. If this was the case, exhibitors would have had a clear fi nancial incentive to prioritize the screening of fi lms in which they retained a higher proportion of revenues. Such an explanation, however, is not plausible. Negotiations between exhibitors and distributors regarding the split of (post-tax) box offi ce revenue were tightly constrained by industry-wide agreements between the national trade bodies representing distributors (ANICA) and exhibitors (AGIS). US fi lm distributors were members of ANICA and were thus bound by the same rules governing fi lm rental contracts as Italian fi rms. There would have been very little scope for US distributors to routinely demand higher rental prices than Italian fi rms. In fact, the AGIS-ANICA agreements allowed scope for renters to charge higher prices for Italian fi lms, which would likely have benefi tted Italian distributors more than American ones. 75 The discrepancy between Italian and American distributors in terms of their ability to maximize the exposure of Hollywood fi lms in the critical fi rst-run markets can be seen as evidence of a liability of outsidership. Domestic distributors, being more deeply embedded within local business networks and enjoying closer relationships with important cinema exhibitors, were better placed than foreign competitors to negotiate for extended fi rst-run bookings for their most popular US fi lms.
US/Italian distribution joint ventures (JVs) were also noticeably more successful than wholly owned US subsidiaries in maximizing the screen time of their top Hollywood pictures. Their performance in this regard was much closer to that of domestic Italian distributors than American ones. Like the wholly owned US subsidiaries, the US/ Italian JVs were heavily reliant on Hollywood product to fi ll their distribution portfolios. The joint ventures, however, enjoyed two important advantages. First, the extent of their dependence on Hollywood product was not as severe (21 percent of fi lms distributed by JVs were Italian, compared to just 12 percent for US distributors). Second, the JVs were better able than US distributors to achieve extended fi rst-run bookings for their most popular American fi lms.
If differences between Italian and American fi rms were clearly evident in terms of the distribution of Hollywood pictures, such differences were less obvious when it came to the handling of Italian fi lms. As Figure 6 shows, Italian distributors were more effective than their American counterparts in maximizing the screen time available to the most popular Italian fi lms, but the difference was smaller than that depicted in Figure 5 . US/Italian joint ventures, meanwhile, appeared to be less effective than either US or domestic distributors in securing extended fi rst-run bookings for Italian fi lms (though with only 115 Italian fi lms actually handled by JVs, and very few of these being hits, we are reluctant to draw fi rm conclusions about the performance of distribution JVs in this particular regard).
The evidence from Figures 5 and 6 suggests that American distribution subsidiaries did face a liability of outsidership relative to domestic rivals in terms of their ability to maximize the exposure of their most popular fi lms in the fi rst-run market. The extent of this disadvantage was more pronounced in relation to Hollywood fi lms than Italian ones. Acquiring the rights to more Italian fi lms was one way 75. The AGIS-ANICA agreement, which ran until June 30, 1961, allowed distributors to charge a maximum rate of 50 percent of net receipts for outstanding fi lms, which were not to number more than a quarter of its total output. But in addition to this, the 50 percent rate could also be charged for a further three Italian fi lms per season. MPEAA Country Fact Book: Italy, December 29, 1960, "Italy Offi ce" 16520A, WBA. in which US distributors could attempt to mitigate their liability. The establishment of a local distribution joint venture was another. Our evidence shows that US distributors were more successful in marketing their American fi lms when working in partnership with a local fi rm. Perhaps as important, however, was the creation of local distribution partnerships, which was a means by which US fi rms could attempt to increase their access to Italian content.
Working toward Insider Status: Partnerships with Local Firms
For American fi lm companies seeking access to the increasingly important Italian market in the 1960s, there were advantages to be gained from establishing alliances with local distributors as well as from securing the rights to distribute high-profi le Italian fi lms. Both of these approaches can be described as methods by which US fi rms became embedded within the domestic Italian market, drawing on local knowledge and connections in order to improve their operational effectiveness. In this section we examine the different strategies pursued by individual US companies as they sought to achieve such objectives.
The establishment of a joint venture with a local Italian distributor was perhaps the most obvious mechanism by which US fi rms could seek to improve their position within the Italian market. In the parlance of the international business literature, such a strategy allowed for the "bundling" of foreign and local assets. 76 In this case, US fi rms provided privileged access to the output of their in-house studio productions (as well as other fi lms to which they held worldwide distribution rights), while the local Italian distributors could potentially provide improved access to the Italian fi rst-run market, as well as access to domestically produced fi lms. As scholars of international business have pointed out, however, the decision to form an international joint venture is not something that multinational fi rms can make unilaterally. 77 For multinationals to combine their resources with those of local fi rms, there also needs to be an incentive for local fi rms to engage in such an alliance. In the case of the Italian fi lm industry, the incentive for US multinationals to seek joint venture partners appeared to be stronger than the incentive for Italian distributors to partner with US fi rms. For US fi rms, the benefi ts of a joint venture included slightly improved access to Italian cinema screens 76. For example, Verbeke, van Tulder, and Voinea, "New Policy Challenges for European Multinationals." 77. Hennart, "Down with MNE-Centric Theories!"
for their own fi lms, as well as potentially greater access to domestically produced fi lms. For Italian fi rms however, the main benefi ts of any such alliance would have been the right to distribute more American fi lms, but as we have seen, not only were the numbers of these declining in the 1960s, it was also far from clear that Italian distributors would have gained anything by increasing the proportion of American pictures within their portfolios. This is refl ected in the fact that only two Italian distributors were involved in joint ventures during our period (out of a total of 59 identifi ed in our dataset), but four US fi rms (out of a total of just seven) embarked on such a strategy. Table 3 provides information on the fi rms involved, the timing of these alliances, and the numbers of fi lms released. The two most enduring joint ventures were those between CEIADColumbia and DEAR-United Artists. In both cases the agreements served to strengthen preexisting relationships that dated back a number of years. 78 With the reopening of the Italian market after the Second World War, Columbia chose not to reestablish distribution offi ces in Italy, but rather to distribute its pictures through Cinematografi ca Edizioni Internazionali Artistiche Distribuzione (CEIAD). Having acted as the exclusive distributor of Columbia fi lms in Italy for a decade, CEIAD entered into joint distribution with its long-standing American partner in the mid-1950s, and as we see from Table 3 , the relationship was still going strong in the 1970s. United Artists had ceased direct 78. Annuario del cinema italiano e audiovisivi 1953-1957 . 1957  43  43  0  0  0  1958  32  32  0  0  0  1959  26  26  0  0  0  1960  25  25  0  0  0  1961  26  26  0  0  0  1962  28  20  4  4  0  1963  75  25  28  22  0  1964  65  19  22  24  0  1965  71  26  23  22  0  1966  78  29  27  22  0  1967  79  25  31  23  0  1968  67  25  38  0  4  1969  68  18  31  0  19  1970  46  18  28  0  0  Total  729  357  232  117  23 distribution of its fi lms in Italy in 1932 and in the postwar years distributed in Italy exclusively through Distribuzione Edizioni Associate Rizzoli DEAR (DEAR) and its predecessor fi rm Distribuzione Associata Internazionale (DAI). As we see from Table 3 , the exclusive distribution agreement was developed into a joint venture in 1962, and as with the CEIAD-Columbia partnership, this lasted into the 1970s. The year 1962 also saw DEAR enter into a joint venture with 20th Century Fox. Rather than building on an established relationship, however, this agreement marked a strategic decision on the part of Fox to distribute in partnership with a local fi rm rather than operating through a wholly owned subsidiary-which had always been previously their mode of operation in Italy. The joint venture was not a complete merger of the two fi rms' distribution businesses in Italy, as DEAR maintained a separate joint venture with United Artists, and when the partnership broke down in 1967 Fox resumed direct distribution of its own pictures in Italy. Following the termination of the partnership with Fox, DEAR entered into a similar arrangement with Warner Bros., although this was even shorter lived.
Correspondence fi les in the Warner Bros. archive reveal that this American fi rm had been in discussion with several leading Italian distributors regarding the pooling of distribution operations in the early 1960s. Following the collapse of an agreement with the producerdistributor Dino De Laurentis, which had gotten as far as receiving approval from the Warner Bros. Board of Directors, the company embarked on detailed negotiations to reach a similar arrangement with the distributor Euro International in April 1963. 79 The Italian manager of Warner Bros. reported that Euro had also previously been in discussion with 20th Century Fox and Universal. 80 The available archival evidence, therefore, would appear to suggest a considerable interest on the part of US distributors in aligning their Italian distribution operations with local fi rms, even if many of the proposed alliances never made it to completion.
Clearly not all US fi rms were able to establish joint distribution arrangements with domestic Italian companies, and where such agreements were reached, some were more durable than others. Even where US fi rms operated through wholly owned subsidiaries, however, it was still possible for those subsidiaries to acquire the distribution rights of Italian fi lms. Warner Bros., for example, had an agreement to distribute the fi lms of the Italian producer Galatea Pictures in the early 1960s, while Paramount made agreements of this type with some of the major Italian producer-distributors such as Lux and Dino 79. Greenberg to Orlandi, April 5, 1963 , "Italy Offi ce" 16520B, WBA. 80. Orlandi to Abeles, March 27, 1963 De Laurentiis at various points during our period. The incentive for Italian producers to enter into such agreements was the potential for improved international distribution of their pictures. Table 4 shows which US fi rms were most successful in securing the distribution rights to domestically produced fi lms in the Italian market.
While the distribution portfolios of all US fi rms were dominated by American productions, we do see some quite signifi cant differences between these companies in the extent to which they handled domestic product. Paramount and Warner Bros. each distributed 55 Italian fi lms during the period, whereas Universal released only six. If Paramount was able to distinguish itself in the Italian market by securing access to high-profi le fi lms by leading domestic producers, MGM was more active than other US fi rms in coproducing with Italian companies. Of all the fi lms released in Italy by US distributors in this period, only 13 were Italian-American coproductions, and of these no fewer than 10 were distributed by MGM. As we have already noted, these American-Italian collaborations were often highly popular with Italian audiences, and half of MGM's local coproductions made it into the highest revenue bracket. Both Paramount and MGM, through their agreements with domestic fi lm producers in Italy, were thus able to construct fi lm portfolios which contained a signifi cant proportion of content with a distinct local fl avor.
The distribution joint ventures between US and Italian fi rms were also able to offer Italian exhibitors a mixed portfolio of fi lms. As Table 5 illustrates, CEIAD-Columbia was comparable with Paramount, in terms of both the volume of Italian fi lms it distributed and the proportion that fell into the top box offi ce revenue category. DEAR-United Artists distributed fewer high-profi le Italian fi lms, but it was able to supplement these with the occasional Italian-US coproduction, as well as a much more regular supply of popular fi lms from other parts of the world (including the series of James Bond movies). 82 The DEAR-Fox joint venture provides an interesting comparison with 20th Century Fox's direct distribution practices. The joint venture was operational for only fi ve full years (out of 14) and therefore handled fewer fi lms than Fox's wholly owned subsidiary, yet it released three times the number of Italian productions. However, it is not apparent that this 82. Of the 20 highest earning fi lm releases in our dataset, three were from the James Bond franchise: Thunderball (1965 ), Goldfi nger (1964 ), and You Only Live Twice (1967 access to Italian pictures did much to boost the American distributor's fortunes. Ten percent of the US fi lms handled by DEAR-Fox fell into the top revenue category, yet the fi gure for its Italian fi lms was just 7 percent. This may provide part of the reason why 20th Century Fox reverted to direct distribution toward the end of the 1960s.
Working toward Insider Status: The Activities of Distribution Subsidiaries
Entering into agreements with local fi lm producers or distributors was clearly an attractive strategic option for US fi lm companies in Italy. Deals with local production companies enabled fi rms like Paramount to offer audiences a regular supply of popular Italian-made fi lms and for MGM to release a series of Italian-American productions. Distribution joint ventures involving Columbia and United Artists allowed these companies to maximize the exposure of their top earning fi lms in the Italian market. But how did such alliances come about? It is one thing to recognize a commercial incentive for partnering with local fi rms, but pursuing such a strategy effectively requires an intimate understanding of local business practices and a high degree of integration within local business networks. To borrow a concept from the strategic management literature, subsidiary fi rms need to 84 If US companies relied on local managers to run their Italian distribution offi ces, what was it that these managers did? What was the nature of their local knowledge, and how did they put it to use in the service of their American employers?
The distribution records held within the Warner Bros. archive provide a valuable insight into the routine functioning of foreign distribution subsidiaries in the 1950s and 1960s. The head of Warner's Italian distribution for much of this period was Umberto Orlandi, and extensive correspondence between Orlandi and his superiors in New York has survived. These records point to four broad areas in which the company drew on the local knowledge of its Italian manager. In each case it would be diffi cult to imagine an American expatriate being easily able to perform an equivalent role.
The fi rst of these areas was Orlandi's accumulated knowledge of local audience tastes and preferences. One of the tasks of local distribution subsidiaries was to supply head offi ce with estimates for fi nal gross billings for all pictures and to update these estimates regularly as fi lms progressed through their distribution runs. (Failure to do this would result in a fi rm rebuke from the Group Treasurer.) 85 developed a keen sense of market trends and were well placed to recommend which fi lms would be most suitable for release in the Italian market and to develop appropriate release strategies. Warner's decision not to acquire distribution rights to the 1960 fi lm Carthage in Flames (director Carmine Gallone) was taken on Orlandi's advice that "the picture has not got the quality that warrants this type of investment." 86 In cases where distribution deals for Italian pictures were agreed, Orlandi also made recommendations as to whether Warner Bros. should also seek international distribution rights. 87 As well as casting judgement on the likely popular appeal of Italian pictures, Orlandi could also infl uence the marketing of American fi lms. In the case of the 1961 drama Fanny (director Josh Logan) he warned against releasing the fi lm under this title in the light of the poor reception of an earlier Italian production of the same name. 88 Foreign distributors who lacked detailed local knowledge were at risk of committing quite serious blunders in the marketing of locally produced fi lms. At one private screening of preliminary footage for a forthcoming fi lm, for example, foreign distributors raised questions about dubbing-not realizing that the actors were speaking in a widely understood Roman dialect. 89 It was not just Orlandi's knowledge of local audience preferences that was sought by his head offi ce superiors, but his understanding of local regulations and their interpretation. He often fi elded requests from New York executives seeking clarity on very specifi c questions relating to matters such as dubbing policy, or the necessity of producing certifi cates of nationality for individual fi lms. 90 Without the ability to obtain quick answers to routine questions such as these, the operational effi ciency of US distributors would have been greatly undermined.
A third area where the knowledge and expertise of local managers was essential was in conducting negotiations with other domestic fi rms. It was Orlandi, for example, who led negotiations with Dino del Laurentis and Euro International about potential distribution joint ventures. While decisions about whether to go ahead with such deals were taken at a higher level, senior executives in New York were heavily reliant on Orlandi's own accounts of the negotiations in reaching their judgements. 91 While major strategic decisions such as the creation of a new distribution partnership were closely monitored by the New York head offi ce, Orlandi had considerably more leeway when negotiating with Italian producers about distribution rights to individual fi lms.
Finally, and perhaps most signifi cantly, Italian managers provided US fi rms not just with access to local knowledge, but also to local networks. Orlandi, for example, was a prominent member of the Italian distributors organization ANICA. In the late 1950s he played an important role in discussions between ANICA and the body representing fi lm exhibitors (AGIS) about the organization of distribution practices in Italy, well before any proposals were put to the managers of other American fi rms. 92 Perhaps the clearest evidence of how Orlandi sought to build and strengthen his informal ties with key fi gures in the Italian industry comes from frequent requests to head offi ce to authorize payment of irregular expenditures. Here is a typical example from December 1954:
In the course of our daily struggle to obtain censorship, visas, importation and exportation permits as well as deblockments, we have received many favours from some gentlemen whose names you know through our correspondence and from whom we expect even more help in the future, so that we cannot let the approaching holidays pass without presenting them with some substantial gift. I therefore am asking your kind authorisation to spend for this purpose the following sums: L.100,000 -Dr. Gianni de Tommasi, Censorship L.100,000 -Dr. Tommaso Rosa, Ministry of Foreign Tradedeblockments, importation, exportation. L.70,000 -Dr. Benito Orta, Presidency of the Council, importation and exportation. I am sure you will understand my necessity in this matter for which I am counting on your warm helping hand. 93 In the same year Orlandi requested (and was granted) permission to spend ₤50,000 on a wedding present for the daughter of a prominent exhibitor in Genoa who at the time held the presidency of AGIS. 94 Similar requests were made (and granted) to contribute to wedding celebrations, obituary notices, or Christmas gifts for a range of fi gures in the industry (usually prominent exhibitors) with the amount of expenditure broadly refl ecting the importance of the individual involved. 95 Occasionally requests were made in the other direction, as when an important New York exhibitor visited Rome with his wife to celebrate their wedding anniversary. On this occasion Orlandi was asked to "extend to Mr. Frisch and his wife the usual courtesies." 96 While the practice of keeping on good terms with important industry partners would have been widespread across different business cultures, the way in which this was done clearly varied between countries where different institutions or "rules of the game" were in place. Institutional weaknesses have been identifi ed as a key factor shaping the evolution of the Italian economy since unifi cation, in particular the limited development of big business. 97 Scholars have also pointed to ineffi cient institutions as part of "a wider picture of regulatory failure that may incentivize borderline, if not illegal, behaviours." 98 Among advanced industrialized countries, Italy has been among the most susceptible to encroachment from the so-called "shadow economy" 99 As far as the cinema industry was concerned, informal ties have always played an important role, and gift practices appear to have been quite common. 100 Local managers in Italy, already embedded within informal networks and familiar with local business practices, were much better placed than expatriates to work towards a position of "insidership" within this business community.
Conclusion
While the cultural impact of Hollywood entertainment on postwar Italian fi lm audiences has been the subject of detailed historical 95. Orlandi to Holenstein, September 19, 1958; Orlandi to Greenberg, September 26, 1961, Box 16682B, WBA. 96. The "usual courtesies" would have involved the sort of hospitality that was extended to visiting fi lm stars, such as delivery of a bouquet of fl owers to their hotel and use of a company car. investigation, 101 this article has been the fi rst to examine how American fi lm distributors adapted to the Italian market. Italy, by the 1960s, constituted one of the largest motion picture markets outside the United States, and thus accounted for a signifi cant proportion of Hollywood's foreign earnings. This was at a time when US domestic cinema attendance was in decline and foreign markets were an increasingly important source of revenue for American distributors. The article has sought to demonstrate that as well as being an important market for US fi lm distributors, it was also a highly competitive one. The market share held by American fi lms declined throughout the period in the face of a resurgent Italian production sector, and while some Hollywood fi lms continued to hold a strong popular appeal, these were outnumbered by popular Italian pictures for most of the 1960s. As such, there was every incentive for US fi rms to take on a distinctly more Italian character if they were to succeed in this valuable market.
But what did localization actually involve for American fi lm distributors? Was it enough for these fi rms simply to offer products that could be perceived as local by Italian audiences (i.e., acquire distribution rights to more Italian fi lms), or did they genuinely need to think and behave like Italian fi rms in order to integrate into local business networks? Our investigation fi nds that both were important. Italian fi lms accounted for a growing share of box offi ce revenues throughout the period, and so access to these fi lms was important if US distributors were to maintain their market position. Moreover, there were fi scal incentives for Italian exhibitors to preference the screening of domestic fi lms over foreign ones, so distributors handling mainly foreign product were at a disadvantage. Our data also show, however, that US distributors were less effective than Italian ones in extending the screen time available to the most popular Hollywood pictures. The problem facing American distributors was not simply that their Hollywood product was seen as "foreign" by Italian audiences who rejected it in favour of something more to their taste. Rather, it was one of persuading fi rst-run cinema exhibitors to allow the most popular of their fi lms extended screen runs. We can, therefore, identify two distinct aspects to the localization strategies being pursued by US distributors. The fi rst can be thought of as a classic business-to-consumer marketing strategy whereby US fi rms sought access to more locally produced content that Italian audiences would not necessarily identify as American. The second involved business-to-business interactions between US distributors and local contacts in which American fi rms needed to demonstrate a much deeper understanding of local business systems and practices.
Different US fi rms responded to the fi rst of these challenges in different ways. Paramount was particularly effective in reaching agreements with leading Italian producers, providing it with the right to distribute a number of popular Italian fi lms. MGM was more notable for its engagement in joint productions with established Italian producers, enabling it to secure distribution rights to some of the most popular Italian-American fi lms of the period. Columbia and United Artists pursued an alternative path of establishing distribution joint ventures with local fi rms (a strategy also briefl y followed by 20th Century Fox and Warner Bros.)
In order to explore the second, and more complex, aspect of localization, we have delved deeper into corporate archives to shine a light on the more routine operational practices of their Italian distribution subsidiaries. Here we arrive at the "front line" at which American fi rms engaged most directly with the domestic Italian cinema industry. The staff working in these offi ces might be thought of as the "foot soldiers" of Americanization, but our evidence suggests that their role was as much one of educating New York executives about the daily realities of the local business environment as it was about spreading the infl uence of the American way of life. Certainly, without the detailed knowledge of these local Italian managers, and access to their networks of local business contacts, it would have been diffi cult for American fi rms to build the sorts of relationships with local producers or distributors on which their localization strategies were based. The closer we get to the mundane operational realities of these
